As you all know I’m a law professor and that means many of the folks I talk to are also law professors. Over the years I’ve had countless exchanges, some casual and some more in the nature of debates, about the value of anonymity for those who provide sperm and eggs to people doing ART. This remains a lively issue among academics.
It’s an important topic, both in terms of the big picture and for the individuals most directly affected. It’s also one where my own views have changed dramatically over the years and are, I imagine, still evolving. This probably makes it especially interesting to me.
Yet it seems to me that questions about the value of anonymity and the ways in which the law should/should not protect/promote it are being outflanked by reality. Which brings me to this blog post. It’s by Wendy Kramer, a co-founder of Donor Sibling Registry (DSR). Continue reading
Here I am again. Been traveling and what-not, but back now. And just in time.
There’s an article in today’s Wall Street Journal–front page–about the price of eggs. (Because the Journal is subscription only, I cannot effectively link to it. Sorry. You may be able to get it through your favorite library, perhaps?) Anyway, I’m especially sorry not to be able to post it because I am actually (briefly) quoted in it. But that’s not really why it is noteworthy.
This actually dovetails reasonably well with the consideration of egg freezing that was underway just before I went traveling. (And on that subject, see this recent Time Magazine article.)
Part of the hook for the WSJ article is the anti-trust suit that began five years ago. The idea here is that there is a suggested cap for what is paid to women providing eggs. Continue reading
One of my favorite blogs is Olivia’s View. There’s a new post there today that has set me thinking. It’s very brief but it adds in to other things.
What’s noted there is that women over the age of 44 are very likely to have trouble achieving a full term pregnancy with their own 44-year-old eggs. I suppose this isn’t news in a general way, but the detailed findings lend stronger support to something we probably knew anyway.
So what will this mean? Long term it seems to me this is good news for the burgeoning business of egg preservation. Young women (say in their early 20s) will be all the more eager to freeze their eggs. The more clear it becomes that you will lose fertility as you age, the more appealing preserving your youthful fertility will be.
But this is only useful Continue reading
It’s not me having second thoughts–sorry if that heading mislead you. A couple of different things have gotten me thinking about gamete providers and second thoughts.
First there is this decision–a significant one, I think–from Illinois. It’s been in the newspapers, but you can read the actual opinion as well. It’s long and deserving of some real consideration. (I’ve also written about it before at an earlier stage of the proceedings.) For my purposes here, though, I’m not going to dwell on the opinion. (I’ll do that another day, soon I hope.) A bare-bones version of the facts will do.
Karla Dunston and Jacob Szafranski were dating. Karla was facing chemotherapy that would very likely destroy her ability to produce eggs. I think this was before the days of reliable egg freezing, but whether this is true or not, Karla thought to preserve her genetic material by having the eggs fertilized and then freezing the pre-embryos. To do this, she needed sperm. She asked Jacob if he would provide the sperm. He agreed to do so. Continue reading
First off, thanks to Natalie Gamble and Bill Singer for pointing me towards this case. It’s actually a nice complement to the Jason Patric case, which has been the focus of a lot of recent discussion here.
A lesbian couple in the UK wanted to have children. One woman provided eggs. (She’s the genetic mother.) These were fertilized in vitro and the resulting embryos were transferred to the other woman’s uterus. (She’s the gestational mother.) The gestational mother gave birth to twins.
Both women cared for the children with the genetic mother assuming the role of stay-at-home mom. As some point one of the earlier-created embryos was transferred to the uterus of the genetic mother and a third child was born. (The third child is a full genetic sibling to the twins.) Continue reading
Here’s an essay that I think is a nice complement to the last couple of posts. It’s from the NYT Motherlode blog and is part of a series by Amy Klein. In this one (published a week ago) she considers whether using a donor egg would matter to her.
There are several things about the essay that I think are noteworthy given the recent discussions here. Most obviously, this is an instance of an individual making precisely the sort of calculation I think one needs to make–weighing the pros and cons before proceeding with something obviously serious.
You can also see consideration of both sides of the balance. Continue reading
I know there’s a lot of discussion in the comments to the last post, and of course I’m quite happy about that. Discussion is good, right? But there’s a point where the comments become cluttered and it’s hard (for me, coming late anyway) to follow it all. So I wanted to try a new post, restating some but then moving along.
At the outset, I want to highlight what I think is the critical question here: “Is being raised by people who are not your genetic parents necessarily bad?” To me the inclusion of the word “necessarily” is critical.
If you leave out “necessarily” and just ask “Is being raised by people who are not your genetic parents bad?” then I think the answer has to be sometimes yes and sometimes no. Continue reading
I wanted to add a couple more notes about the Florida opinion I wrote about a couple of days ago. And while I’m doing that, there’s a Nevada opinion from just a little while back (October 3) that I wanted to tie in here. It’s virtually a mirror image of the FL case.
First, two more points about the FL case–what I think of as the good and the bad, really. And these are taking a step away to get a little bit of a longer view.
The good: From what I can tell (and I do not have any access to the facts) the court decided this case in a way that I think reflects the reality of the family life that gave rise to it. There are many indications that both women functioned as parents to this child during the first two years of the child’s life. Continue reading
I’m interrupting myself (though I really want to get back to “social infertility” and what to think about it) because there is an interesting and important new case out of Florida. You can read the opinion (though it is long) and I’m sure in time there will be press, too. (I wrote about this case when it was decided by the lower court and you might want to read that, too. )
I want to offer some initial thoughts here, though think it quite possible I will find that I need to revise them as I think further. The case covers a lot of ground and might have some broad implications–or at least suggest some broader arguments.
The facts are pretty simple. DMT and TMH were lesbians in a long-term committed relationship. They wanted to raise a child together. TMH provided an egg. It was fertilized in vitro and the resulting pre-embryo was transferred to DMT’s uterus, which means DMT was pregnant with/gave birth to the child. Continue reading
Someone (ki sarita, in fact) raised an excellent question in an early comment on the last post: Why would you call Monica Schissel a surrogate when she is a pregnant woman and she is genetically related to the fetus she carries? There is some discussion of this in the last post, but I’ve been thinking about it more generally. This leads me to some observations that might be useful or, failing that, at least interesting.
It seems to me you can think about pregnant women as falling into one of four categories. Here they are:
A: Intending to be parent and genetically related to embryo
B Intending to be parent and NOT genetically related to embryo
C NOT intending to parent and genetically related to embryo
D. NOT intending to parent and NOT genetically related to embryo. Continue reading