Lesbian Mother/Grandparent Visitation, III: Ruminations

Over the long weekend, while I wasn’t posting, I was thinking about the Indiana case I’ve been writing about.  (There are two earlier posts–here and here, which you might want to look at to get up to speed.)   (I’ve also been irresistably drawn to consider Michael Jackson’s children, which I’ll get to very shortly.)  

There’s a factor that complicates my response to the Indiana case, one that I’d like to try and separate out.  The dynamic that lead to the grandparent/parent breakdown, which in turn lead the grandparents to sue for visitation, was driven by the grandparents response to their daughter’s lesbianism.   It’s explicit in the opinion that the grandparents intolerant condemnation of BLH’s relationship with KW and their refusal to accept KW as a member of their family lead to the litigation. 

The grandparents’ conduct strikes me as fundamentally unacceptable.  This cannot help but color my initial response to the case.  Since the basis on which the grandparents seek to claim rights to the child is unacceptable, it is hardly surprising that I am satisfied with the court’s resolution of the claim–a resolution that rejects the grandparents request.    

Here is what troubles me, though.   The reaction I describe above is not grounded in the particular analysis of who might or might not be a parent to the child.   I find myself wondering how my own response might change if the facts were different. 

So I consider this hypothetical.   The initial facts match those of the actual case:  unmarried woman become pregnant, the man with whom she had sex has no involvment, her pregnancy is difficult, her parents support her and then the child through the first five years of the child’s life.    At this point, the mother of the child embarks on a new relationship, and my hypothetical diverges from the real case.  Suppose the mother’s new relationship is with a man who is a member of a small racist society.   He persuades the mother of the correctness of his view and after a time she decides that she’d like him to play a parent-like role in the child’s life, inculcating the child with his racist views.   The grandparents, who are far more supportive of diversity, object and seek visitation with their grandchild. 

The facts here are different.   But is the case legally distinguishable?   Could a court reach a different conclusion consistent with the Indiana case?   Do I want them to?   Can I argue that in both cases the more tolerant influence should prevail, because it is better for the child and/or better for the world?   I think to be consistent with my general theme in this blog, I need instead to focus on what the relationship between the various parties and the child actually is.  

What this highlights is that I have not (at least not yet) posed any challenge to the notion of parental rights.   The invocation of those rights allows a person to raise a child as she/he chooses.   If the grandparents in the original case are allowed to claim parental rights, then they are entitled to teach the child to be intolerant of lesbian relationships.    If they mother in my hypothetcial is allowed to claim parental rights, then she is entitled to teach the child to be intolerant of those of different races.     

There are two possible ways out of the dilemma, I think.  One is to restrict parental rights so that they are more clearly limited–there would be some things (intolerance?) you could not teach your child.   The other is to determine who does and who does not get parental rights based on what they would do with them.   The latter seems to me to be unprincipled.  It would warp the doctrine of who gets recognized as a parent in order to obtain the correct results.   And that’s what I fear might be going on in my initial thinking about the Indiana case.

And so I return to the facts of the original case.  It seems to me there is a fairly decent argument that for a time, the grandparents should have been entitled to recognition as de facto parents.    Had they been recognized as such, this would have stood them on an equal footing with their daughter.  It would have shifted the final inquiry that the court made to the “which home is better” sort of inquiry.   There’s no telling how that might have been resolved.  I’m not at all happy about this, but I think this approach is more consistent with my developing views.  And of course, in the real case the grandparents did not claim parental status at the right time, nor would they likely be recognized as de facto parents in Indiana.

Advertisements

One response to “Lesbian Mother/Grandparent Visitation, III: Ruminations

  1. Well, hopefully this will make you feel a bit better.

    Something that particularly irritates me about the case in question is this: why does everyone assume the grandparents ever actually acted as de facto parents to the child? Would they still think this if the parent in question were not a mother, but rather a father?

    The mother in question was a CPA, working as a consultant, and thus traveling for a good portion of the week as most consultants do. She lived with the grandparents, paid them for childcare costs and rent, provided financially for the child, bought groceries, signed the child up for extracurricular activities and went to parent-teacher conferences whenever she could, and cleaned the grandparents’ home. She returned every weekend from business, and took over all parental responsibility for the child.

    She simply thought it would be better (for both the child and the grandparents) to allow the child to stay in the home she SHARED with the grandparents during her absences for business, rather than set up her own separate residence (which she was financially more than capable of doing) and hire a nanny to take care of the child. Never did she mooch, never did she refuse her responsibilities as a parent. She simply made a choice that she thought was best and kindest for both her child and the grandparents.

    Then she, apparently, had the AUDACITY to fall in love, set up her own residence with her own son, and eventually get married. And the grandparents are suddenly suing for rights, and people honestly believe they deserve the rights of parents?

    Out of curiosity, had the mother in question decided to set up a separate residence and hire a paid nanny, would anyone be saying that the nanny deserved de facto parent status? Is it simply the fact that the grandparents are blood relations that elevates them in others’ eyes?

    And, honestly, I can’t say that there isn’t also some obvious gender discrimination here. If this were a case where the mother had been male rather than female would almost anyone be objecting to her actions? If this had been a high-powered male consultant away on business half the week and providing all financial support for his child and as much personal support as his job would allow, while paying the grandparents for childcare rather than hiring a nanny, would many people have trouble with this? I think not.

    I have fairly strong opinions on this, clearly. And I think the Appeals Court’s ruling was 100% just.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s