I approach the topic of birth certificates with some trepidation, because it seems to be a particularly controversial topic. I approach Australian law with great trepidation, as I have no real understanding of Australian law. I rely on what others say, and that is always risky. So you can just imagine the degree of trepidation with which I approach the topic of Australian birth certificates. But nonetheless, here I am.
Some background first: One problem with talking about birth certificates is reaching an agreement about what they are/what they do. I’ve written about this a number of times. (See above trepidation.)
A number of things make the topic more complicated than it might at first seem. For one thing, I assume every country (and many states) have their own ways of doing things. Continue reading
A few months ago I wrote about Thomas Lippert. Lippert worked for a fertility clinic in Utah in the early 1990s and apparently substituted his own sperm for that of intended genetic fathers on at least one occasion. This came to light recently as genetic testing revealed that a 21-year-old was the genetic child of Lippert and not, as was thought, her social/psychological (and legal) father.
Because this happened quite a while back and because the clinic closed in 1997, details of exactly how this happened are scarce. It is, however, clear that Lippert was anything but a model citizen. (He died in 1999.)
Once the story came to light, the University of Utah (the clinic had some affiliation there) did an investigation. And now that is complete. So the next chapter in this story is the University’s response. While it is interesting, it is not entirely satisfactory. Continue reading
First off, thanks to Natalie Gamble and Bill Singer for pointing me towards this case. It’s actually a nice complement to the Jason Patric case, which has been the focus of a lot of recent discussion here.
A lesbian couple in the UK wanted to have children. One woman provided eggs. (She’s the genetic mother.) These were fertilized in vitro and the resulting embryos were transferred to the other woman’s uterus. (She’s the gestational mother.) The gestational mother gave birth to twins.
Both women cared for the children with the genetic mother assuming the role of stay-at-home mom. As some point one of the earlier-created embryos was transferred to the uterus of the genetic mother and a third child was born. (The third child is a full genetic sibling to the twins.) Continue reading
Many of you will know that there is a case from Kansas that I have been following for some time. Before I get to the newest twist, I’ll do a quick summary. For more details follow the link to earlier posts.
Angela Bauer and Jennifer Schreiner were a lesbian couple seeking to have a child. They found William Marotta via a Craig’s List ad. He agreed to provide sperm and, in a written contract, agreed that he would be a donor only and not a legal father.
The problem is that in Kansas that contract does not have legal effect. What would have accomplished the purpose was if the sperm had been provided to a doctor rather than directly to the women. An agreement–even a clear written agreement–simply doesn’t do it under KS law.
Now as it happens all of the individuals involved (Marotta and the two women) honored the agreement. The child was raised by the two women and had no contact with Marotta. But then the one woman who was a legal mother needed financial support from the state and the state, looking to recoup its costs, determined that Marotta was a legal parent and hence owed support. It commenced suit against him. Continue reading
A couple of days ago I blogged about the contested parentage case involving Jason Patric. There’s been a bunch of discussion there and as I was reading through it I thought of an interesting variation on the problem.
To be clear, this has absolutely no basis in fact, as far as I know. But since (as I pointed out before) we really don’t know the facts that seems fine to me. Instead, a variation like this (what law professors generally call “hypothetical”) allows you to test you thinking about legal rules. It allows you to see which facts would matter to you–and that in turn can lead to questions about why those facts matter.
With all that in mind, here’s the imaginative exercise. Suppose they facts are as we know them–which is to say that there is disagreement between the parties about what exactly the plan was, but somehow the plan went forward. Further, suppose that (as is the case) after the birth of the child the man played some role in his life. (We can talk about what role if you like–but in the real case that’s a part of the contested facts, so I won’t lay it out here). But now suppose that just before heading into court we learn that, through some terrible error, the sperm used to create the child was NOT Jason Patric’s. Continue reading
I know that the parentage case involving Jason Patric and Danielle Schreiber has been all over the web for a long time but as it has finally arrived in the NYT, I thought I might as well take the time to comment. I don’t think I can begin to summarize the facts, so for starters I’d suggest you go and read the article. (I’m going to work off the facts as reported there.)
One thing to note at the outset is that many of the facts are disputed. I don’t pretend to have any special knowledge of the facts. Thus, I do not know about what did or did not happen. For instance, I do not know why Jason Patric was the one who took Gus to be circumcised when Gus was eight-days old. But there do seem to be a bunch of things that there is agreement about. Jason Patric is the genetic father of Gus. Continue reading
As you’ll know if you’ve been reading here regularly, I’ve run across a whole string of cases involving the marital presumption recently. (This is the presumption that a child born to a married woman is the (legal) child of the woman’s husband.) These cases all arise when a man who is not the woman’s husband can invoke DNA testing to demonstrate that he is the genetic father of the child. And then the question is “what next?”
In most of these recent cases the husband and wife standing together can fend off the genetic father. There’s a sort of “he should have known better” response. (If the husband doesn’t want to claim legal parentage, he typically doesn’t have to.) In one (from CA), the case is remanded for further proceedings, though my sense was the husband was likely to win there.
Here’s yet another of the cases, this one from Kansas, decided by the court of appeals there last week. I think it follows the path laid out in CA though the ultimate outcome seems less clear to me. Continue reading
There’s a new opinion from Texas that serves as a bit of a cautionary tale. Marvin McMurray and his partner wanted to have children. A friend of Cindy Close agreed that she would become pregnant via IVF using embryos that were created from McMurray’s sperm and an egg from an unknown provider. Close gave birth to twins–twins she was not genetically related to.
I think what I’ve said so far is what everyone agrees about. But if that looks like an odd telling of the story, it’s because at the core of the story is a fundamental disagreement and so I haven’t recited it. Instead I’ll give you two versions–keeping in mind that I have NO IDEA what’s true here.
McMurray version: Close was a friend helping out McMurray and his partner by serving as a surrogate. She wasn’t going to be a parent to the children. (It says she would play “no role” but I assume this might mean “no special role” since if she’s a good friend she’d like be around some.).
Close version: McMurray was aware of Close’s desire to have children and they agreed to coparent. (This of course makes me wonder about why the third party egg, but there could be reasons for that.) Continue reading
I’ve been teaching the cases that I’ve recently posted here–the string of cases from CA, UT and MI in which a woman gives birth and both her husband and her ex-lover want to be legal parents to the child. In each of them the ex-lover is the genetic father of the child. In two of the cases the husband wins decisively. The one from CA is less clear–it is remanded for further proceedings. But it seems very unlikely to me that the genetic father can prevail under the described test.
As I reread the cases I was struck by the ways in which the different courts justified their conclusions. I thought it was worth summing them up here.
Before I do that, though, I want to note that none of these are really constitutional cases. Continue reading
I’m returning to a theme I’ve written about before here. I’m doing this for two reasons. First of all, before is about four years ago and many readers may not have been readers then (or if they were, they may have forgotten about this). In addition, I am a different person today than I was then (then being 2010) and so perhaps I have something different to say.
In fact, I think the same thing has moved me to write today as moved me to write in 2010: Michael H vs. Gerald D. I won’t discuss it in any detail here. You can read the opinions (though it’s not an easy slog) or you can read the earlier posts about it. But for today’s purpose a quick outline will suffice.
Carole was married to Gerald. She had an affair with Michael. She got pregnant and Victoria was born. Victoria is (let us assume, as it was a 98% likely proposition) genetically related to Michael. Carole and Victoria live for a time with Michael and for a time with Gerald, but eventually it seems that Carole and Gerald reconcile and settle down. Continue reading