More on Dividing ART

Here I will carry on a bit from the last post.   (And I remind you–I’m away from home with only occasional web access and so I cannot create internal links.)

For the moment I am considering the idea that you could have two distinct sets of rules for parentage, one of which is used for ART (however it might be defined) and the other for everything else.  This is an alternative to having a single and uniform set of rules that would apply in all cases.  (That’s a possibility that I’ve considered elsewhere–or at least begun to consider.  I find it an attractive goal, but it is always good to consider alternatives as well.)

Anyway, if you have two different and distinct sets of rules, then one crucial question is where you draw the line between the territory (as it were) of one rule and territory of the other.  (There are also obvious questions about what the rules actually are, but I’ll set those questions aside at the moment in favor of this more abstract question about where to draw the line.)  Put another way, in this context the question is what counts as ART and what counts as “everything else.”

I’m considering two different places one might draw the line.    You could draw a line between conception via sexual intercourse on the one hand and everything else, this latter category being designated ART.   Or you could draw the line based on whether conception is in utero or in vitro.   Again, the latter category would be designated ART, the former “everything else.”

One thing to think about is that ART as defined by this second line would include less than ART as defined by the first line.   In particular, assisted insemination with donor sperm (AI) would count as ART if you draw the first line, but it would count as ‘everything else” if you drew the second.   You can therefore ask which side of the line AI belongs on.

I have to pause here, because there’s at least one significant question that I can see here.  If one is drawing lines, why stop at one?  Why not draw two line?   You could put sexual intercourse in one category, AI in a category by itself, and then “everything else” in a third category, with three sets of rules instead of two.

It’s perfectly plausible.  Indeed, one could continue to draw lines and devise rules until you had a different set of rules for each imaginable set of circumstances and technologies that could lead to conception.  And every rule could be custom-tailored to whatever narrow set of circumstances it was to serve.  It’s possible–perhaps even likely–that if you did this that the rules would be subtle and nuanced and that each could be fine-tuned to suit the circumstances.  But the cost of this tailoring would be immense confusion about which rules apply exactly when.   In the end, you probably need to balance the value of nicely-tailored rules against the simplicity of having to draw only a small number of lines.   So, for the moment, I will leave it at one line/two rules.

So I return to the question of figuring out which side of the line AI belongs on.   Is it more like sexual intercourse or more like the “everything else” category?   But here I’m afraid my entire approach could founder.   The “which is it more like” question is not one that can be answered in the abstract.  It can only be answered in a particular context, with a particular purpose in mind.   It’s a bit like asking whether a bicycle is more like a car or more like a scooter:  It all depends on why you are asking and what it is you really want to know.  I think this suggests that I need to focus on the salient characteristics of the various modes of conception I’m trying to sort.